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Terrorism, Violence and Conflict in the Digital Age 
 
Lee Jarvis, Lella Nouri and Andrew Whiting 
 
 
Introduction  
Cybersecurity throws up obvious and important challenges for the academic discipline of 
International Relations and the materialist, state-centric ontology around which it has been 
traditionally organised. Such challenges might also, as a consequence, throw up similar 
problems for related or derivative fields of enquiry including Terrorism Studies and Peace and 
conflict studies (PCS). In this chapter, we explore the nature of such challenges as well as the 
potential of these research traditions to contribute to our understanding of one much-discussed 
example thereof: cyberterrorism. How, we ask, might these disciplines address this most recent 
articulation of terrorism? And, how might contemporary debate on cyberterrorism benefit from 
reflection on earlier discussions in these broad areas? Our discussion proceeds in three stages. 
 The chapter begins with a brief overview of the diversity of threats that exist within 
cyberspace today. Here, we identify three broad categories - malicious software, hacking and 
online disruption. We argue that these share a common logic that centres on the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities within target systems. A second section then offers a brief discussion of the 
parameters of Terrorism Studies today, before reflecting on the implications of activities 
potentially readable as cyberterrorism for this field. Here, we point to longstanding questions 
around definition, threat and response in terrorism research, as well as the recent broadening 
of terrorism studies associated with Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS), and especially 
constructivist analyses therein. Constructions of cyberterrorism, we argue, problematise 
established responses to these questions. The chapter’s third section then turns to literature 
associated with Peace and Conflict Studies. Here, we argue that this work has value for 
understanding cyber activities for several reasons. These include, first, a history of debate 
around the nature of ‘violence’ that might be put to work for thinking through the implications 
of non-corporeal or non-physical attacks, for example those targeting data. Second, a 
longstanding emphasis on interdisciplinary research, that stretches back to the Cold War origins 
of this field. And, third, an engagement with international issues and analyses that stretches 
beyond the parameters of states and their relations.  
 
Threats in Cyberspace 
On stepping down as head of Microsoft in 2008, Bill Gates noted that he and Paul Allen had 
dreamt about putting a computer on every desk when they established the company in the 1970s 
(Beaumont, 2008). Perhaps they did not envision (but likely they did) a world such as today’s 
where computer technology has become so ingrained within daily life: a world where 
computers reside not only on desks at home and in the office, but in briefcases and pockets, on 
coffee tables and wrists, and even, now, on the bridges of noses. The proliferation of different 
devices, the consistent rate at which microprocessors have become smaller and more powerful 
(Moore’s Law), and the continued growth of the Internet has seen computer technology 
penetrate all manner of aspects of everyday life, from the trivial to the serious. 
 Digital technologies are now vital to the organisation of political, social and economic 
life including in the management of critical infrastructure, the storing of consumer and citizen 
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information, the collection and analysis of intelligence on potential security threats, the 
exchange of billions of pounds of online trade in financial and other markets, and the 
functioning of military hardware. The extent to which computer technology has penetrated 
recreational and working lives, as well as the patterns and structures of domestic and 
international governance, has been likened by some to a ‘dependency’ (Kizza, 2014, p. 76). If 
this ‘dependency’ generates potentially desirable gains in efficiency, reliability and velocity, it 
also produces new problems associated with ‘cyber-threats’. Whilst the nature, motives and 
manifestation of these have varying levels of complexity and seriousness, such threats typically 
share an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities permitting unauthorised access to target systems. 
This is the case in the efforts of ‘script kiddies’ to deceive ‘ordinary’ computer users into 
downloading simple e-mail borne viruses, on the one hand. And, on the other, state-supported 
experts engaging in acts often understood as cyber-war such as the targeting of critical 
infrastructure via malicious software. 
 Although threats in cyberspace often blend different techniques, the most commonly 
observed are threefold: malware attacks, ‘hacking’, and online disruption. Malware - which 
includes viruses, worms and Trojans - refers to “software that has malicious intent to create 
harm to the computer or network operation” (Zolkipli & Jantan, 2011, p. 199). Examples 
stretch from simple e-mail attachments such as the ILOVEU bug of 2000 which caused minor 
damage to a user’s computer before sending itself to others via the initial victim’s address book, 
through to modern ‘Advanced Persistent Threats’ such as Stuxnet, Flame, and Duqu. Although 
targets may differ radically, the premise beneath these remains the same: locate a vulnerability, 
then write a piece of software that once delivered will insert foreign code into a ‘normal’ 
programme modifying it to perform a function unintended by its user (Chen & Davis, 2008, p. 
545).  
‘Hacking’ is a broad term referring to the gaining of unauthorised access to a computer 
system. As a result, it will likely play a part at some stage of a large proportion of computer-
based attacks. However, it is included here as a standalone category due to the prevalence of 
hacks in recent years responsible either for defacing and disrupting websites, or for the theft 
and dissemination of sensitive information. Both of these kinds of ‘hacks’ are commonly, 
although not exclusively, used by ‘hacktivist’ collectives. That is, with groups such as 
Anonymous and the Syrian Electronic Army which select particular targets because of their 
potential publicity impact, or due to perceptions of the target’s corrupt or unjust behaviour. For 
example, a year after the suicide of Aaron Swartz (the hacker who used the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology’s computer network to illegally download a number of academic 
journals from JSTOR) Anonymous defaced MIT’s website with a message highlighting the 
injustice of US computer crime law (Telegraph, 2013). Swartz’s hack of JSTOR could itself 
be considered a prominent example of the other kind of hacking (relating to data theft) but an 
even more high profile case (certainly in the UK) is that of Gary McKinnon and his accessing 
of 97 computers (a combination of US military and NASA systems) either in an attempt to 
coerce the US or to find evidence of UFOs (House of Lords, 2008).   
Online disruption - especially via Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks - 
represents a different risk again. DDoS attacks attempt to overwhelm the capacity of the servers 
hosting a particular website by having a large number of computers access the site 
simultaneously. Although closely associated with hacktivism, it has proved a popular technique 
for sub-state and state actors alike, being used for example, as part of Anonymous’ ‘Project 
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Chanology’ attacks on the Scientology website as well as suspected Russian attacks on a 
number of Georgian websites during the 2008 conflict (Tikk et al, 2008, pp. 8-9). Although 
DDoS can be achieved via coordination with likeminded users, botnets (networks of infected 
computers working together unbeknownst to their owners) are often used to increase the traffic 
to a target site beyond manageable numbers.  
To date malware, hacks, and DDoS attacks tend to have been used for reasons of 
financial gain, disruption, accessing information, raising awareness of a cause or injustice, and 
(less prominently) sabotage. For a number of reasons, however, categorising such attacks is far 
from straightforward, with the lines separating terms in our cyber-lexicon - which now includes 
cyberterrorism, cyberwar, cybercrime, cyberespionage, cyberjihad and so on - far from 
straightforward or uncontested (Jarvis and Macdonald, forthcoming, a). A useful example of 
this arrives with a hacking attack on the computer systems within Arizona’s Department of 
Public Safety (DPS) on 24 June 2011, which led to the download and release of ‘hundreds of 
law enforcement files’ (Sanchez et al, 2011). Responsibility for this was subsequently claimed 
by LulzSec, a hacktivist collective with a more “light hearted” rationale than others.1 A few 
days later, LulzSec announced its plans to disband, prompting the following response from the 
DPS explaining that it would continue to pursue those responsible for the hack: 
 
The week of June 20, 2011, the Arizona Department of Public Safety became aware that their email 
system had been compromised by a known cyberterrorism group, known as LulzSec. The group appears 
to have gained access to the email accounts of at least seven DPS employees. The cyberterrorism group 
has posted the stolen information on their website. Law Enforcement agencies are working to identify 
the source of the cyber-attack and have initiated a joint criminal investigation (Arizona Department of 
Public Safety, 2011, our emphasis). 
 
‘Cyberterrorism group?’ Whilst it is clear that the definition of terrorism is far from settled 
(Jackson et al, 2011, pp. 99-123) and definitions of cyberterrorism are perhaps even less so for 
a number of reasons (Jarvis et al, forthcoming), this theft and publication of sensitive materials 
would seem on first reading at least to have little in common with the instrumental, 
communicative violences we tend today to associate with terrorism (Jackson et al, 2011, pp. 
115-118). How is it, then, that a group known primarily for defacing websites, stealing 
information, and embarrassing governments and major corporations is suddenly deemed 
‘terrorist’?  
 In a similar vein, readers may be surprised to discover that cyber-war is now also upon 
us (at least, according to some experts). James Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski for example, 
claim that Stuxnet (the computer worm allegedly launched by U.S. and Israeli forces against 
an Iranian nuclear facility), demonstrated that, “for cyber war, the future is now” (Farwell & 
Rohozinski, 2011, p. 23). Leading computer security company Symantec (n.d.) corroborated 
this view, arguing that Stuxnet could have had multiple different purposes, but amongst the 
‘most obvious’ were ‘sabotage, destruction, and cyber war’. As with the relationship between 
the DPS hack and terrorism, Stuxnet’s connection to war seems potentially problematic. On 
the one hand, it seems rash to discount the significance of a piece of malware with a genuinely 
unprecedented level of complexity and disruption capable of affecting such a key site of Iranian 
                                                             
1Although LulzSec have targeted high profile organisations including the United States Senate and the CIA, their 
mottos are indicative of their actions’ motives, or at least rationale: "The world's leaders in high-quality 
entertainment at your expense" and "Laughing at your security since 2011".  
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infrastructure. On the other hand, however, wars do not tend to be characterised by seemingly 
one-off instances of disruption such as this.   
 Do activities such as these, and their subsequent understanding, meant that war is 
different in cyber-space than in physical space? And, does the same apply for terrorism, 
activism, violence, aggression, and so on? Despite the readiness of many to prefix established 
categories of political violence with ‘cyber’, other authors such as Rid (2013) and Conway 
(2004) are far more sceptical of the value of such attempts to make sense of (or construct) 
contemporary developments. To evaluate these debates, this chapter turns now to the value of 
Terrorism Studies as a potential source for resolving such conceptual and related issues in the 
light of cybersecurity concerns including those outlined above. 
 
Terrorism Studies and Cyber Threats 
The academic field of Terrorism Studies is a comparatively young one that only began its 
emergence as a recognisable area of scholarly enquiry in the early 1970s (Jackson et al 2011: 
11). Terrorism research has, as Schmid (2011: 462) notes, “been more often criticized than 
praised”, for, as Silke (2004: 1-2) provocatively summarises: 
 
 Research on terrorism has had a deeply troubled past. Frequently neglected and often overlooked, the 
 science of terror has been conducted in the cracks and crevices which lie between the large academic 
 disciplines. There has been a chronic shortage of experienced researchers - a huge proportion of the 
 literature is the work of fleeting visitors: individuals who are often poorly aware of what has already 
 been done and naïve in their methods and conclusions. Thus, while the volume of what has been 
 written is both massive and growing, the quality of the content leaves much to be desired.  
 
Critics of what has been termed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ argue that the field - although, 
undeniably diverse - replicates or reproduces a problem-solving emphasis that has, until 
recently, dominated International Relations and Strategic Studies more broadly (see Cox, 1981, 
p 128). This, in turn, is linked to criticisms of the field’s methodological and analytical 
limitations, its state-centric ontology, the embedded nature of terrorism experts, and the 
prioritisation of policy-relevant analysis (Jarvis 2009, pp. 7-13; Ranstorp, 2009, pp. 1-33; Silke, 
2009, pp. 34-48; Stump and Dixit, 2013, pp. 1-4). Although similarly diverse, advocates of 
‘Critical Terrorism Studies’ tend to argue for greater reflexivity in research, a model of 
scholarly responsibility organised around critique rather than policy-relevance, and, a 
movement away from essentialist conceptions of terrorism (Jarvis, 2009, p.14). In this sense, 
contemporary ‘critical’ approaches might be considered, in part, as an effort to problematise 
and recast the perennial questions of definition, causation and response within terrorism 
research, to which we now turn (see Jackson, 2007; Jarvis, 2009, Stump and Dixit, 2013). 
  
 Attempts to define ‘terrorism’ as an object of scholarly knowledge - and reflections on 
the challenges of so doing - have been integral to terrorism research for many years (compare, 
amongst many others, Schmid and Jongman 1988; Badey, 1998; Kennedy 1999; Silke 2009: 
35-48). Indeed, one recent survey identified over 250 such definitions from academic, 
governmental and intergovernmental sources (Easson and Schmid 2011). Whilst some have 
met this contestability with resignation, arguing this definitional quest is either unnecessary or 
even, “inhibiting the proper study of terrorism” (Malik 2000: xvii), others have posited 
academic, political and policy reasons for its continuation (Jackson et al 2011: 107). 
5 
 
Importantly, for our purposes, this definitional contestability has been directly transplanted into 
the relevant academic literature on cyberterrorism. Of particular debate, in this context, has 
been the importance of physical violence as a generative characteristic of terrorism in its 
various incarnations. On one side of this discussion are advocates of a limited, narrow 
definition of cyberterrorism - sometimes referred to as ‘pure cyberterrorism’ (Gordon and Ford, 
2002, p. 637) - for whom, “an attack should result in violence against persons or property, or 
at least cause enough harm to generate fear” (Denning, 2000) for it to qualify as cyberterrorism. 
On the other side of the debate are subscribers to a broader use of the concept, for whom any 
terrorist activity online might qualify as cyberterrorism: whether cyber-attacks, communication 
via email, or reconnaissance activities (see Gordon and Ford, 2002). As a recent survey of 
researchers revealed, such discrepancies in the meaning and use of the concept of 
cyberterrorism are as common as they are for its ‘parent’ concept. These definitional 
differences, moreover, have implications for our answer to quite fundamental questions relating 
to cyberterrorism, including whether or not a cyberterrorist attack has ever even taken place 
(Jarvis et al, 2014, pp. 74-83).  
 As this suggests, discussions of cyberterrorism throw up considerable challenges for 
prominent understandings of terrorism. In the first instance, cyber-attacks such as via malware, 
hacking or efforts at online disruption might require a rethinking of what ‘violence’ is in the 
context of terrorism (does data destruction, for example, count as such), as well as a significant 
broadening of terrorism’s current manifestations: from bombs to bytes, and so on. At the same 
time, broader accounts of cyberterrorism might encourage or even require us to rethink the 
importance of traditional generative characteristics of terrorism - such as violence - in their 
entirety. Here, some have argued that cyberterrorism is linked to, yet so distinct from, its 
progenitors that simplistic formulae of the sort “cyberterrorism = terrorism + computers” fail 
to recognise the peculiarities of the cyber environment (see Jarvis and Macdonald, 
forthcoming, b). As Holt (2012: 341) puts it: 
 
while there is no single agreed upon definition for cyberterror, it is clear that this term must encapsulate 
a greater range of behavior than physical terror due to the dichotomous nature of cyberspace as a vehicle 
for communications as well as a medium for attacks. More expansive definitions … provide a much more 
comprehensive framework for exploring the ways that extremist groups utilize technology in support of 
their various agendas. 
 
One obvious retort to such arguments would posit ‘cyberterrorism’ as a misnomer in these 
discussions; one generated either by misrecognition of the essence of terrorism, or by more 
wilful attempts to scaremonger or demonise certain groups. On the other hand - taking 
inspiration from earlier debates including around ‘environmental security’ (Græger 1996: 111) 
- we might argue that cyberspace and terrorism are already so firmly linked in political and 
other discourse that a responsibility to engage with portmanteau terms such as cyberterrorism 
already exists: whether for the purposes of critique or problem-solving. 
 Beyond straightforward definitional discussion, references to cyberterrorism pose 
additional issues for assumptions and typologies common within terrorism research. In spite of 
its apparent novelties, for example, cyberterrorism would not seem automatically to fit into 
discussions of ‘new terrorism’ and the threat posed by networked, transnational, religiously-
inspired groups willing to engage in, “mass-casualty attacks against civilians” using “excessive 
violence” for performative or theatrical effect (Neumann, 2009, p.29). In other words, 
established conceptions of terrorism and its historical development - whether dichotomous 
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(new/old) or revolutionary (‘waves’ of terrorism) - might be seen as either limited or 
misleading once we introduce cyber-activities into terrorism research. Those existing histories 
might also, moreover, both engender and camouflage threat assessments relating to terrorism 
that look rather different once cyberattacks are considered. Thus, on the one hand, there is a 
risk that cyberterrorism’s likelihood is evaluated through potentially outdated models of 
terrorism crafted for offline scenarios - whether as rational actor (Giacomello 2004) or seeker 
of theatre (Conway 2011) - that may not automatically translate to cyber-domains. 
Alternatively, it is also possible that a misunderstanding or neglect of possible cyber-attacks 
engenders incomplete or inadequate models of (offline) terrorism. 
 A third feature common to much terrorism research is a prioritisation of the issue of 
responding to terrorism and a widespread sense that scholars working in this field should 
contribute to the formulation of policies for dealing with its threat to the state and its citizens 
(Jackson et al 2011: 14-15). The possibility of cyberterrorism, we suggest, throws up additional 
questions in this area too. In the first instance, there is, of course, considerable variation across 
legal definitions of terrorism which differ markedly between countries. As cyberterrorism is 
very rarely separated out within legal frameworks - being typically approached simply as one 
type of terrorism - particular legal settings are therefore central to determining whether any act 
might be treated as an example of cyberterrorism. One recent comparison (Hardy 2011; Hardy 
and Williams, forthcoming), for example, identified marked differences in this context between 
the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In all of these countries but Canada, a cyber-
attack on non-essential infrastructure could be prosecuted as terrorism. Of these four, 
moreover, only New Zealand has in place a requirement that an attack be likely to endanger 
life. 
 A second issue relating to response is the diversity of perspectives on the significance 
of the threat posed by cyberterrorism more generally (see Jarvis et al 2014). On the one hand, 
there are those who argue that cyberterrorism is both potentially appealing to terrorists and a 
threat to national security (Collin 1997; Denning 2002). The second view - more common 
within recent discussion - is that the threat of cyberterrorism has been overdramatized by media 
and political elites to create a nightmarish scenario which does not represent the real existence 
of a threat. Thus, Conway (2002, p. 11) for instance, argues that cyberterrorism merely neatly 
merges two of today’s biggest fears – technology and terrorism. Clearly, such discussions are 
impacted by definitional issues. If, for example, we adopt a broader definition of cyberterrorism 
that encompasses any use of computers and the Internet by terrorists, then the perceived threat 
of ‘cyberterrorism’ automatically increases given the greater feasibility of such activities (see, 
for example Jarvis et al, forthcoming; Weimann, 2006; Conway, 2002).  
 While debates of this kind have their importance for terrorism research, so do more 
contemporary constructivist explorations of the discursive imaginaries at play in this latest 
incarnation of the terrorism threat. Such debates fit more easily with the sympathies of many 
associated with Critical Terrorism Studies than they do with the problem-solving, policy-driven 
approach characteristic of alternative forms of terrorism research. For example, Cavelty 
demonstrates how cyberterrorism is an amalgamation of hyperbole-inspired fear constructed 
around tropes of randomness, incomprehensibility and uncontrollability (Cavelty, 2007, p. 29). 
Research of this kind offers a different way of thinking about cyberterrorism that explores the 
use of language in the framing of threats; examines the intertextuality of constructions of 
cyberterrorism; questions what discourses do in terms of informing response and action in this 
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context; and, allows scholars of Terrorism Studies to think more broadly about who or what 
benefits from constructions of the cyberterrorism threat (see, Jarvis et al, forthcoming).  
 As this discussion suggests, activities potentially readable as cyberterrorism throw up 
considerable challenges for longstanding debates around definition, threat, and response within 
terrorism research. Discourses around cyberterrorism, moreover, pose interesting new research 
avenues for constructivist work typically associated with Critical Terrorism Studies. In the 
following, we turn now to the value of a related field of enquiry - Peace and Conflict Studies - 
for engaging with such issues. In so doing, we ask whether Terrorism Studies is best, uniquely, 
or even appropriately positioned to engage with these questions. 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies and Cyber-Threats 
As there are difficulties of discussing ‘Terrorism Studies’ as a unitary discipline, so too does 
‘Peace and Conflict Studies’ (PCS) represent a heterogeneous field of enquiry. It is a field, 
moreover, that contains within it a diverse range of normative agendas, ontological and 
epistemological standpoints, and research goals. Although beyond the scope of this chapter to 
provide an overview of the PCS research agenda, this section seeks to highlight broad features 
therein which are indicative of this field’s capacity and limitations in relation to the analysis of 
cyber-security issues.  
In the broadest sense, PCS is interested in the identification, diagnosis and remedy of 
conflict and its causes (Galtung, 1996, p. 1). Here, a commitment to investigate the absence of 
‘peace’ within disciplinary and geographical spaces is connected to a critique of narrow and 
established approaches to violence and a sympathy toward ‘trans-disciplinary’ and 
international research (Galtung, 1996, p. 1). This commitment is reflected in research that 
draws upon disciplines such as Gender Studies, Economics, and Psychology to further 
understanding of complex intertwined issues (Mayor, 1995; Barbieri, 1996; Tint and Sarkis, 
2013).2 For Terrorism Studies, the embrace of multi-disciplinarity is arguably a more recent 
development, coming, in part, as a result of criticisms landed against orthodox terrorism studies 
and its apparent Western-centrism (Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Herman and O’Sullivan, 
1989; Jackson et al 2011, p.38-39): criticisms that contributed to the formation of the 
aforementioned CTS research project. The multidisciplinary and international research focus 
of PCS, coupled with the infancy of cyber-security issues and discourses, gives researchers a 
golden opportunity to shape debate in this area. Cyber-security concerns are almost always 
international in nature, and one also only needs to take a cursory glance at many of these to see 
potential contributions from a multitude of disciplines, including the Computer Sciences, Law, 
and Politics. Projects with this approach have already begun to emerge3 and future researchers 
will need to continue to strive to form and strengthen partnerships with colleagues across 
disciplinary and national borders where requisite knowledge may not be limited to one 
institution or discipline. 
 Linked to this embrace of internationalism is a twofold problem upon which PCS and 
Terrorism Studies may be able to shed light. This is, first, the appropriateness of the current 
state-centric international system for dealing with issues of cyber-security; and, second, the 
                                                             
2 In addition to these sorts of publications several dedicated multidisciplinary intuitions exist for the study of 
peace, see: The Institute for Economics & Peace, http://economicsandpeace.org/ and The “Gender, Conflict and 
Peacebuilding” Research centre at PRIO led by Torunn Tryggestad, 
http://www.prio.no/Projects/Project/?x=770.  
3 See: The Cyberterrorism Project (2014) www.cyberterrorism-project.org. 
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question of how international cooperation can be encouraged to create a more genuinely 
international response to such a diffuse problem with little regard for state borders. Taking the 
first aspect of this problem, we might look to PCS for ways to empower non-traditional security 
actors and bring others into the fore as part of a genuine effort to cooperate in understanding, 
managing or even reducing online threats. For example, PCS research into the impact of non-
governmental agencies (see: Richmond and Carey, 2005; McDermott, 1998) in peacebuilding 
operations and humanitarian intervention could yield useful insight into forming effective 
coalitions in the pursuit of shared cybersecurity goals. Although it would be a gross 
oversimplification to suggest these two scenarios can be directly compared, this kind of 
research experience could be useful in efforts to get government, public institutions, the private 
sector, academia, and the general public working more cohesively on some of the most pressing 
cyber-security issues. 
 Alongside the challenge of extended engagement is the question of how to bring states 
themselves closer together on the topic of cyber-security. It is often said, by those in 
government and outside of it, that the nation state cannot solve the problems of cyber-security 
alone. As the UK’s recent Cyber Security Strategy (2011, p.22) put it, “though the scale of the 
challenge requires strong national leadership, Government cannot act alone. It must recognise 
the limits of its competence in cyberspace”. The result of this has been a number of initiatives 
and partnerships aimed at bringing international governments closer together (European 
Convention on Cybercrime 2001), creating stronger partnerships with business and industry 
(Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership 2013), and educating the average user on 
Internet safety (Stay Safe Online.org 2014). However, as with elsewhere, the success of such 
initiatives is a matter of much debate; in particular those agreements that purport to establish 
functioning cooperation between states. For example, Micheal Vatis acknowledges the 
significance of the European convention on Cybercrime, that it ‘represents the most 
substantive, and broadly subscribed, multilateral agreement on cybercrime in existence today 
[...] it offers a relatively comprehensive approach to harmonizing national legislation to address 
cybercrime’. However, focusing on these headlines misses the numerous problematic details 
such as a lack of signatories outside Europe, the lack of Russia and China’s involvement and 
how ‘the Convention also allows Parties to refuse to assist in many instances where assistance 
would conflict with domestic law or, notably, where a country claims that providing assistance 
would prejudice its sovereignty’ (Vatis, 2010, pp. 221-222). Thus, if inter-state cooperation 
remains a desirable end in the realm of cybersecurity, analysts here might benefit considerably 
from the history of engagement with non-traditional security actors  within PCS and (to a lesser 
extent) terrorism research.  
Earlier in this chapter we argued that cybersecurity concerns throw up definitional 
challenges for terrorism research. Questions of definition have, of course, raged within PCS, 
too, not least in the minimalist/maximalist debate over this field’s appropriate remit. As such, 
the typology of ‘direct’, ‘structural’, ‘cultural’ and other violences provided by Galtung - and 
developed by others (see, for example: Christie, 1997; Galtung, 1969, 1985, 1990; Galtung and 
Höivik, 1971; Christie, 1997) - may offer resources for assessing the stakes and parameters of 
more contemporary debate around the nature and limits of cyberterrorism. Thus, where Galtung 
(1985: 145) argued, “Peace Studies should cover both” direct and structural violences, in order 
to move, “from prevention and control of war to the study of peaceful relations in general” 
(1985, p. 145), similar advice might be appropriate for the contested nature of ‘cyberterrorism’, 
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not least given the challenges thrown up by thinking through violence and harm in this context. 
In other words, perhaps the distinction between terrorist attacks using cyber-technology 
(narrow approaches to ‘pure’ cyberterrorism), and more mundane uses of the Internet by 
terrorist organisations (broader approaches), becomes less appropriate once we move beyond 
limited conceptions of violence. Moreover, given the lack of traceable - or (in the case of 
botnets) even obvious agency - within cybersecurity challenges, perhaps the relaxation of 
criteria of intentionality within broader conceptions of violence might also be useful for 
understanding phenomena such as cyberterrorism. 
Whilst PCS therefore has potential resources for the analysis of contemporary issues 
(real or constructed) such as cyberterrorism, there are challenges here as well. Important 
amongst these, is the problem-solving nature of much peace research with its normative 
emphasis on ‘peace-keeping’ and ‘peace building’ (Toros and Tellidis, 2013) might render 
critical engagement with discourse around cybersecurity more difficult than in other domains. 
This is, not least, because of the challenges of accessing accurate, reliable information in this 
area in such a way as to avoid reproducing governmental understandings of threats, events and 
vulnerabilities. This is not, of course, a new debate, with accusations that peace researchers 
had become more closely aligned with powerful elites being levelled against the discipline 
already during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Eide, 1972). Indeed, Matti Jutila, Samu 
Pehkonen and Tarja Väyrynen go as far as to talk about the discipline’s ‘decline’ arguing that 
it needs to take heed from the critical turn in Security Studies and reinvent itself as Critical 
Peace Research in order to ‘revitalise’ a discipline which is ‘barely responding to any external 
stimulus’ (Jutila, Pehkonen, Väyrynen, 2008, p. 631).  
This returns us, finally to the value of recent interest in CTS, and in particular 
constructivist critiques of terrorism that have succeeded in problematising sedimented 
understandings of terrorism, terrorists and terrorist attacks. Work in this area has opened up 
space for a questioning of counter-terrorism measures as well as debate around the politics of 
labelling and threat construction. Studies into cyberterrorism, we argue, should harness the 
normative appeal of the most radical strands of PCS and CTS research by concentrating on the 
critique of knowledge claims and the policy frameworks they both support and derive from. 
This should not, however, mark the end of policy-relevant research in this area, or beyond. 
 
Conclusion 
Underpinning this chapter is a view of Terrorism Studies and Peace and Conflict Studies as 
sharing two characteristics. First, both of these fields - as with all fields of enquiry - are 
constantly in flux and evolving. Although it is possible to point to the endurance of particular 
research questions, agendas, theories and methods within each over time, both have changed 
in the past and will do so again in the future. Second, both of these fields are also heavily 
contested, and subject to internal debate over their core concepts and purposes. They are also, 
moreover, influenced by debates and developments from ‘outside’ their borders: empirical as 
much as scholarly. As argued above, cyberterrorism does indeed pose challenges for 
established accounts or conceptions of these fields, but it is far from alone in so doing, and we 
need also caution against essentialising scholarly paradigms and pursuits that are both porous 
and dynamic. 
 With these caveats in mind, our argument in this chapter is that activities that might be 
described as cyberterrorism pose challenges for scholars interested in each of these areas. In 
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relation to terrorism research, potential security threats such as hacking or online disruption 
prompt reconsideration of definitional issues at the heart of this enterprise requiring a thinking 
again of the meaning and importance of categories such as ‘violence’ which recur throughout 
established understandings of terrorism. If we are willing to include such activities under the 
heading ‘terrorism’, they also, moreover, throw up research agendas and questions on 
subsidiary debates, including around the causes of terrorism more broadly. As suggested above, 
established models relating to threat and its drivers might be inappropriate once we expand our 
conception of what constitutes terrorism. Cyber-activities also pose questions for existing 
policy proscriptions and frameworks in relation to counter-terrorism. Whilst there might be 
some broad continuity between the offline and online worlds here (for example the need for 
international cooperation), there also exist potential particularities in the latter. These include 
technological particularities - how to prevent viruses, hackers and so forth - but extend beyond 
this to include such issues as the (cyber)strategic cultures of different states and other actors. 
 The chapter’s final section identified potential value for analysing cyberterrorism 
within the development and successes of research associated with Peace and Conflict Studies. 
We argued that this field’s international and interdisciplinary focus speaks directly to the nature 
of contemporary cybersecurity challenges. As, we suggested, does previous conceptual work 
therein on categories including violence and peace. Thus, research in this tradition - as well as 
discursive analyses speaking to constructivist work within Critical Terrorism Studies - has real 
potential for furthering our understanding of ‘cyberterrorism’ and its significance within 
contemporary political existence. 
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